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Abstract 
This thesis aims to investigate the dynamics of the so-called “leverage-effect”. This 
asymmetry in volatility after negative shocks, relative to positive shocks has been 
documented extensively before. However, except for findings that it is not due to 
leverage, the underlying or enhancing factors that cause it have not been 
investigated. This thesis aims to do so, by testing for the influence of firm-specific 
variables on this volatility asymmetry size. The methods that are used are both GJR-
GARCH(1,1)-modeling and the use of panel-data. The results show, except for the 
leverage variable, that firm-specific variables do indeed have their own 
characteristic effect on the size of the volatility asymmetry. The combined R-
squared of the firm specific variables shows a good fit; hence they do form a 
considerable part of the contributing factors to the size of volatility asymmetries. 
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1 Introduction 
The introduction will, in several stages, outline why this thesis has been written and 
which methods are employed to do so. It will do so by first giving a background, based 
on empirical evidence and previous research. The reasoning behind the topic will then 
follow and eventually it will briefly outline the structure of this thesis. 
 
1.1 Background 
``A drop in the value of the firm will cause a negative return on its stock, and will 
usually increase the leverage of the stock. [...] That rise in the debt-equity ratio will 
surely mean a rise in the volatility of the stock''. 
- Fletcher Black (1976)  
 
With these words Fletcher Black laid the foundation for the phenomenon of the 
leverage effect. Black observed that the volatility of stock prices is inversely 
correlated to the actual stock prices. What he meant by this is that a negative return 
on a stock will cause an increase in volatility that is greater than what it would have 
been, had the return on the stock been positive and of equal size. This observation 
has been confirmed and disputed by many other investigations into the matter. For 
example (Har, Sunderam, & Ong, 2008) conclude that the leverage effect does not 
exist in Kuala Lumpur, for the period 2004 to 2007. However, many papers, such as 
(Schwert, 1989), (Bekaert & Wu, 2000) and (Braun, Nelson, & Sunier, 1995) come to 
the conclusion that it does exist.  
 
The academic society therefore generally assumes that the leverage effect 
substantially influences levels of volatility. How this happens is, however, strongly 
debated. According to (Black, 1976) the larger increase in volatility after a negative 
return is due to the change in leverage of the underlying asset, the firm. (Christie, 
1982) comes to a similar conclusion and intuitively one might say that this is valid, 
as a drop in equity value will increase the degree to which a firm is levered. This 
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increase in leverage will consequently cause the firm to be closer to default, as the 
decline in equity value will be of equal size as the change in the present value of the 
assets. This will in turn cause the firm to incur distress costs and this will result in 
investors being increasingly skeptic towards the firm.  
 
This notion has, however, been contested numerous times since then. (French, 
Schwert, & Stambaugh, 1987), (Figlewski & Wang, 2000) and (Hasanhodzic & Lo, 
2011) for instance, come to the conclusion that the effect may exist, but probably 
not (solely) due to a change in leverage. Even more compelling is that (Hasanhodzic 
& Lo, 2011) finds that the effect seems to be more severe for all-equity firms. The 
leading thought nowadays then is that the leverage effect may in fact not be due to 
financial leverage. What does cause it then, has barely been investigated. 
 
1.2 Aim and Objective 
This thesis then, will examine what has not been examined before: the underlying 
factors causing the “leverage” effect. We aim to fill in this blank spot in academic 
research to volatility asymmetries and to further explain this anomaly. This should 
be a valuable contribution to previous research and the financial profession as a 
whole, as volatility is one of the pillars of financial research and lies at the heart of 
risk modeling and valuation. 
 
Since leverage does not seem to cause the volatility asymmetry we make another 
assumption, which is that other firm specific variables may enhance this asymmetry. 
For this reason several other factors, which differ in size per firm, are chosen and 
then regressed on the size of their respective leverage effect.  
 
The research question that is deducted from the introduction above is the following: 
 
“Which firm specific attributes, if any, enhance the “leverage” effect?” 
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1.3 Thesis Outline 
This research question will be examined in depth throughout the coming chapters. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: 
 
The next chapter will address the theoretical background and has two parts. In the 
first part the concept of volatility will be reviewed and special attention is paid to 
the way it has been modeled through time. To do so various volatility forecasting 
models that have been used over time will be discussed, which will eventually lead 
up to the now most commonly used model: the GARCH(1,1)-model.  The other part 
will then discuss the various firm specific factors that will be regressed on the size 
of the volatility asymmetry. This chapter will briefly outline why and how certain 
variables are expected to affect the size of the volatility asymmetry.  
 
Chapter three will discuss the data that is used for the tests, as well as the methods 
that are employed to do so. This entails the dataset, its requirements and the models 
that are used to estimate the size of the volatility asymmetry and the regression 
used afterwards to test for firm specific influences. 
 
Chapter four presents the results of the tests that are run on the data using the 
previously discussed models. It will furthermore give additional insights and discuss 
the findings. 
 
Chapter five will summarize the results and present the conclusions. It will also 
relate them to previous research and make recommendations for further research 
on this matter or related subjects.  
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2 Literature and Theoretical Review 
This chapter will first address volatility in Finance and how it is measured and ends up 
with the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-model to model volatility asymmetries. Then various firm-
specific variables, which will be used in the tests, are explained using empirical 
evidence both in favor and against the idea of volatility asymmetries. 
 
2.1 Volatility Modeling in Finance 
2.1.1 Uses for Volatility 
Volatility is measured extensively in finance and is considered to be one of its most 
important concepts. The primary reason being that volatility is an important input 
to determine risk. For this reason volatility is used both for risk management 
purposes and for asset pricing. Both will briefly be discussed in 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2. 
 
2.1.1.1 Asset Pricing 
The Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), introduced by Markowitz, illustrates how 
volatility is used for asset pricing (Markowitz, 1952). The theory states that the 
variance of a portfolio can be obtained with the following formula: 
𝜎𝑃
2 =  ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗𝜌𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (1) 
Where 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗  stand for the weight of the investments in respectively asset i and j. 
𝜎𝑖 and 𝜎𝑗  represent the volatility of these assets and 𝜌𝑖𝑗  the correlation between 
them.  According to the formula, the variance of a portfolio containing two assets 
can be estimated as follows: 
𝜎𝑃
2 = 𝑤1
2𝜎1
2 + 𝑤2 
2 𝜎2
2 + 2𝑤1𝑤2𝜌12𝜎1𝜎2 (2) 
From this formula it follows that an investor can reduce his risk by investing in 
assets that are not perfectly correlated. This inspired (Sharpe, 1964), (Lintner, The 
Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments, 1965a), (Lintner, 
1965b), (Treynor, 1962) and (Mossin, 1966) to develop the model that we now 
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know as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This model can be formulated as 
follows: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓) (3) 
In which: 
𝛽𝑖 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑚)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚)
 (4) 
Where 𝑅𝑖 is the expected return of asset i and 𝑅𝑚 the expected return of the market. 
As formulated in equation (4), 𝛽𝑖 is the correlation of the market returns and the 
asset returns. The idea of the CAPM is that correlation between the volatility of the 
assets and the volatility of the market is priced, because the risk cannot be 
diversified away. This pushes the demanded return for investors upwards.  
 
What is evident here is that volatility is the connecting and determining factor in 
asset pricing. 
 
2.1.1.2 Risk Management 
Another important field of finance, in which volatility is also the corner stone, is risk 
management. A simple representation of the formula to calculate the portfolio’s 
Value at Risk (VaR) is formulated below, using a normal distribution,: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑝 = 𝑉𝑝(−𝜇𝑝 − 𝜎𝑝𝑧1−𝛼) (5) 
Where 𝑉𝑝 is the value of the investment in the portfolio and 𝜇𝑝 the average return. 
𝑧1−𝛼 Is the z-score, given a normal distribution. The presence of 𝜎𝑝 in this formula 
shows once again the essence of a good framework for volatility estimation. 
 
In another risk management model, the Merton model, one also finds that the 
calculation of the Probability of Default (PD) relies heavily on the volatility of the 
underlying asset (Merton, 1974). Even more so, the Distance to Default (DD), which 
is used to calculate the PD, is expressed as the number of standard deviations the 
underlying asset is from default. 
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2.1.2 Unconditional Volatility 
At the origination of the Merton model, but also at the origination of for instance the 
Black-Scholes model the assumption is that volatility is constant (Merton, 1974). 
However, looking at historical data on any kind of security or asset, it is clear that 
this is not the case. Volatility is not a constant factor, but is conditional on time 
(Andersen & Bollerslev, 1997) and comes in clusters, as is noted by (Mandelbrot, 
1963): “Large changes tend to be followed by large changes, of either sign, and small 
changes tend to be followed by small changes.” 
 
This is interesting information, as this undermines, in part, the validity of a lot of 
models. When one looks, for example, at the Value at Risk formula in equation (5) it 
can be seen that it relies heavily on the standard deviation. However, this risk 
measure may not be as accurate as one would ideally like it to be, when 
unconditional volatility is applied. It is therefore useful to know the conditional 
volatility and preferably the forward-looking version of it, as anticipating an 
increase or decrease in riskiness presents the possibility to act accordingly, before it 
has actually become reality (Kuester, Mittnik, & Paolella, 2006). In short then, it is 
crucial to estimate volatility correctly. For this reason it is interesting to go into 
more detail how volatility works and on what factors it is dependent.  
 
To start off, unconditional volatility will be explained for a time series of stock 
returns, rt. This begins with calculating the error term, ut, of the returns. Starting off 
with a regression for the individual price forming and returns of a series: 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑ 𝜅𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (6) 
Where: pt = price of an asset at time t 
  c = constant term of the returns  
κi = parameter for explanatory variable xi 
xi,t = explanatory variable i 
εt = residual term at time t 
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The returns of an asset then are as follows: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 (7) 
It then depends on the state of the dataset what follows. Assuming a dataset with a 
fixed beginning and ending, the average (expected) return, μi, can be calculated by 
simply taking the sum of the returns and dividing this by the number of 
observations: 
𝐸[𝑟𝑡] = 𝜇 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑟𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (8) 
The residual term for each observation can then be calculated as: 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑟𝑖,𝑡] (9) 
Note that this assumes a fixed mean that does not change through time, as it would 
when for instance a Moving Average-model (MA(q)) would be used. If that were the 
case the mean would obviously differ through time, but the calculation of the error 
term would be the same.  
 
Repeating this process from equation (9) for every observation in the series and 
calculating the average of all observations, will yield the average error, E[ui,t] = 0. 
Squaring the error term for each observation and taking the average of it will in turn 
result in the unconditional sample variance.   
𝜎?̂?
2 =
1
𝑇 − 1
∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑇
𝑖=1
 (10) 
Taking the square root of the unconditional sample variance will then yield the 
standard deviation. For the remainder of this thesis this will not be done, as the 
variance in this sense merely imposes a non-negativity constraint on volatility1. 
 
Taking a closer look at equation (10) above, it is clear that the variance in this 
scenario is unconditional. It is therefore considered to be constant throughout the 
sample. As stated before, this may be theoretically accurate, but in practice the 
                                                        
1 For more information on this constraint: (Brooks, 2008). 
 13 
variance differs from time to time and comes in clusters. This presents a challenge: 
backward looking variances may not sufficiently cover the risks that one faces. For 
this reason various models have been created to forecast volatility, based on 
historical data. One of the first modern models to do so is the ARCH(q)-model, 
presented by Engle in 1982. 
 
2.1.3 The ARCH(q) Model 
In 1982 Engle presented his ARCH(q) model (Engle, 1982). This model let go of the 
assumption of homoskedasticity2. As stated before, this provides a much more 
realistic perspective on things. The model is still not able to predict variance out of 
nowhere, but this does mean that an ARCH(q) model will change its predictions 
regarding the variance when a spike in variance has occurred in the observation 
preceding the lag to be forecasted. Hence also the name of the model; the model is 
conditional on the heteroskedastic nature of the sample.  
 
The ARCH(q) model can be written as follows: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑢𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑞
𝑖=1
 (11) 
Where : a0 > 0, 
  ai  ≥ 0 
 
H0: There are no ARCH effects, that is, there is no heteroskedasticity 
Ha: There are ARCH effects, that is, there is heteroskedasticity 
 
Looking at this model, it can be seen that it requires several arbitrary inputs. The 
first to look at is the number of lags, q, to take into account. (Engle, 1982) uses four 
lags, but this choice was mostly arbitrary. The second thing to take into account is 
the estimation of the error term. This term is now conditional on time, and as such it 
                                                        
2 Homoskedasticity assumes constant variance: 𝐸[𝜎𝑡
2] = 𝜎2 < ∞. 
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may be counter intuitive to use a constant mean. Engle himself advocates the use of 
the conditional mean and gives the example of an AR(1)-process: 
𝑦𝑡 = Φ𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 (12) 
The conditional mean, Φ𝑦𝑡−1, then is in part dependent on the preceding lag, which 
is given by:  
𝑦𝑡|𝜓𝑡−1~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑡
2) (13) 
 
In this formula ψt-1 is the information set that determines the conditional mean. The 
unconditional mean is assumed to equal zero. 
 
On the other hand, he also points out that for instance (Klein, 1977) uses moving 
averages. An alternative view is proposed by (Figlewski, 1997), who gives the 
example that traders often use three months of daily data. But then adds that 
around one out of three times these estimates could be as much as 85% off the real 
volatility value on an annual basis. Consequently he proposes the use of either a 
zero-mean or the use of the risk-free rate as the mean.  
 
Eventually the mean is not the biggest worry there is, as long as extreme sample 
mean returns are not used (Figlewski, 1997). This does, however, not solve the 
problem of the number of lags, q, that are required. This problem was no longer 
relevant when (Bollerslev, 1986) came along. 
 
2.1.4 The GARCH(p,q) Model 
In 1986 Tim Bollerslev adjusted the ARCH(q) model to become the GARCH(p,q) 
model. The most common version of this model is the GARCH(1,1) model, as it takes 
all previous lags of variance into account by construction. To show this, consider the 
general form of the GARCH(p,q) model: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑢𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑞
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2
𝑝
𝑖=1
 (14) 
Transform this into a GARCH(1,1) model, which can be written as equation (15): 
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𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝑎1𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2  (15) 
Where : 𝜔 > 0,    
  𝑎1 > 0, 
𝛽 > 0 and 
𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1.  
 
Remember however, that the variance of the previous lag is also included: 
𝜎𝑡−1
2 = 𝜔 + 𝑎1𝑢𝑡−2
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−2
2  (16) 
This in turn leads to: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝑎1𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽(𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑢𝑡−2
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−2
2 ) (17) 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝑎1𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑎0 + 𝛽𝑎1𝑢𝑡−2
2 + 𝛽2𝜎𝑡−2
2  (18) 
 
Consequently this process would theoretically go on till infinity and therefore more 
than one lag for both the variance and error terms is unnecessary. 
 
Now there are several extensions to this model. All of which are aimed at modeling 
some anomaly or another. The one this thesis will focus on is that after a negative 
shock the variance will increase more than after a positive shock of equal size. 
 
2.1.5 Asymmetric Volatility and Applicable Models 
As mentioned before, volatility asymmetries are considered common finance theory 
and therefore several models have been created to model them. Two GARCH-models 
have been further specified to take those asymmetries into account. The first one is 
the E-GARCH, as published in (Nelson, 1991). Nelson finds that negative returns 
result in a bigger volatility rise than positive returns of the same magnitude do. 
Furthermore he finds that standard GARCH models inadequately measure this 
effect. Assuming normality, (Nelson, 1991) used the following E-GARCH model: 
ln(𝜎𝑡
2) = 𝜔 + 𝛽 ln(𝜎𝑡−1
2 ) + 𝛾
𝑢𝑡−1
√𝜎𝑡−1
2
+ 𝛼
|𝑢𝑡−1|
√𝜎𝑡−1
2
− √
2
𝜋
 (19) 
Using this equation the volatility asymmetry effect is observed when 𝛾 > 0.  
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Furthermore, no restrictions have to be applied on the parameters, since the log of 
the variance is modeled. So even if the parameters are negative, the estimated 
variance will be positive. This can be considered a benefit of the E-GARCH model. 
 
Two years later (Glosten, Jagannathan, & Runkle, 1993) created another asymmetric 
GARCH model, which is known under the name GJR-GARCH. This latter model 
forecasts the volatility slightly more accurate than the E-GARCH model (Liu & Hung, 
2010). The GJR-GARCH(1,1)-model relies on the following formula: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝑢𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑡−1 (20) 
Where  It-1  = 1  for all ut-1 < 0 
   = 0 for all ut-1 ≥ 0 
 
Furthermore we apply the following restrictions:   
 𝜔 > 0, 
𝛼 > 0,  
𝛽 ≥ 0 and  
𝛼 +  𝛾 ≥ 0. 
 
The use of both models gives rise to certain expectations. Given the explicit way that 
negative returns are more aggressively modeled than the standard GARCH(1,1) 
model, one can expect a higher volatility after a negative shock. This is exactly what 
one would expect to see and by default is due to the rise in leverage of the 
underlying firm. However, a “higher” volatility in itself is a bad measure. Therefore 
the focus is on the gamma, which is expected to be positive, should the solely 
negative stock returns prove to significantly influence the forecasted variance. 
Which factors may have an influence on this gamma (γ) will be discussed in the next 
part of this chapter. 
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2.2 Firm Specific Variables 
Offered explanations for the aforementioned volatility asymmetry do exist. 
(Hasanhodzic & Lo, 2011) reason that the cause of the leverage effect may be 
psychological in nature. Other research like (French, Schwert, & Stambaugh, 1987) 
and (Campbell & Hentschel, 1992) suggests that the cause of the leverage effect may 
be related to the fact that increased volatility would increase the required risk 
premium. A higher risk premium would drive the stock price down. However, the 
problem is that this suggests a reverse causal relationship; the increased volatility 
drives the stock price down instead of the causal relationship suggested by (Black, 
1976), that a downward movement of the stock price increases the volatility. 
However, no research has been conducted thus far as to the influence of firm 
specifics on the size of volatility asymmetries.  
 
The following sub-chapters will describe why certain ratios and values that are 
unique for each firm may influence the size of a possible volatility asymmetry. 
 
2.2.1 Debt-Equity Ratio 
The first possible contributor is the ratio of the Debt level as opposed to the level 
Equity that a firm holds. This heavily relates to what (Black, 1976) originally 
assumed to cause the “leverage effect”. Black assumed that a negative shock in stock 
prices, and thus equity, increase the leverage and therefore increase the risk of 
equity. The cost of equity then goes up and the value drops accordingly.  
 
A deduction that could follow then is that firms with already high debt levels will 
have a steeper increase in the riskiness of equity (and debt), as they are closer to 
incurring costs of financial distress. One would therefore expect that firms with high 
debt levels are more prone to volatility asymmetries, than firms with lower debt 
levels. As mentioned in the introduction, (Hasanhodzic & Lo, 2011) have found this 
to be unfounded, as they found that all-equity firms seem to have a larger volatility 
asymmetry.  
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On the other hand (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998) documents that companies that 
become highly levered due to takeovers seem to be distressed rather quickly. This 
could be used to underwrite the phenomenon of the “leverage effect”.  
 
2.2.2 Price-Earnings Ratio 
The second possible contributor to volatility asymmetries is the Price-Earnings 
ratio. A high P/E-ratio might indicate overvaluation (Basu, 1977) and high P/E-
ratios are often associated with high growth expectations. Empirical evidence has 
shown that these expectations are often overestimated (Malkiel, 1963). However, 
the market will gradually correct this overestimation and return the stock price to 
its correct level (Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994).  
 
The theory is that the market is aware of this overvaluation and will therefore 
respond more heavily to a negative shock as it would to stocks they assess to be 
correctly valued or undervalued. For this reason it could be expected that 
overvalued stocks, stocks with a high P/E-ratio, would react heavier to negative 
shocks than stocks with a lower P/E-ratio. This was evident during the collapse of 
the dot-com bubble in the period of 1999-2001. Overvaluation led to an extreme 
increase in volatility. This may also be deducted when regressing the P/E ratio on 
the size of the volatility asymmetry. 
 
Opposing this theory is (La Porta, Lakonishok, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1997), which 
finds that stocks with high P/E-ratios are often considered to be so called “glamour 
stocks”. In this sense investors keep these stocks in their portfolio because of their 
name and general allure. As a result these stocks are often overvalued for extended 
periods of time. Investors though, hold on to them regardless. From this perspective 
one would expect no real causal effect between the P/E-ratio and the size of the 
leverage effect.  
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2.2.3 Firm Size 
The third possible contributing factor is firm size. This factor has been used in 
several models and is widely assumed to influence stock returns, both for the better 
and for the worse. Should size prove to be of significant influence on the size of 
volatility asymmetries there are two scenarios to be expected.  
The first scenario is that size negatively influences the size of volatility asymmetries; 
smaller firms would then be more prone to the asymmetry. There are several 
reasons to believe this; one of the reasons is mentioned in the article of the three-
factor model of Fama and French. This article describes how smaller firms tend to 
recover slower from economic downturns than bigger firms (Fama & French, 1992). 
This argument is supported by (Chan & Chen, 1991), who argue that bigger firms 
are more stable than smaller firms. They assess that this is due to the less efficient 
way that smaller firms are, on average, run. As a consequence smaller firms are 
overleveraged and tend to be easily distressed after a big downturn. This 
explanation then, essentially boils down to the perception that smaller firms, for 
various reasons, have a higher risk on their assets than bigger firms. This translates 
directly to the risk of levered equity (LE), as equation (21) below shows: 
𝛽𝐿𝐸 = 𝛽𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 [1 +
𝐷
𝐸𝐿
] (21) 
 
A contradicting view is that larger firms are more sensitive to this volatility 
asymmetry. A cause for this is presented by (Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004), who find 
that larger firms get more coverage and that the information asymmetry between 
the firms and the market is therefore smaller. A consequence of this is presented by 
(Ciner, 2003), which finds that smaller firms over all experience lower trade 
volumes than larger firms. One may therefore wonder if the idea of a volatility 
asymmetry is even feasible for smaller firms. 
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2.2.4 Net Margin Level 
The fourth possible contributing factor is the net margin. This factor tells us about 
the efficiency of a company. A higher net margin entails that a company is able to 
turn its investments efficiently into sales, thus a high revenue stream, relative to the 
incurred costs in achieving them.  
 
One could assume two scenarios here as well, as there are different theories about 
it. For instance, (Qualls, 1974) states that companies that have high profit margins 
will not be able to sustain those for the long term. In this sense the same reasoning 
as overvaluation for the P/E-ratio works. Essentially the high profit (net) margin 
cannot stay at the high current level and is bound to go down at some point, the 
exceptions being monopolies and oligopolies. In markets with perfect competition 
the margin will theoretically converge to zero, where markets with high market 
concentration and entrance barriers will be positive and the persistence of high 
margins will be stronger. In this scenario the net margin will therefore be positively 
correlated to the size of the volatility asymmetry. 
 
On the other hand, one could assume the opposite to materialize. Companies with 
low net margins have trouble turning their invested capital into value. These 
companies cannot maintain this state of affairs for too long, for the economic 
distress will eventually turn into financial distress. This can have all sorts of 
unfavorable consequences and put the state of the company under further duress 
(Andrade & Kaplan, 1998). One can be sure that the market will take note and will 
put this company under the loop. This could translate into a more severe response 
should negative news come out. In this scenario the net margin would be negatively 
correlated to the size of the volatility asymmetry. 
 
 
 
 
 21 
3 Data and Methodology 
In this section the data and employed methods will be discussed. First we will address 
the assumptions we make and the reasoning behind the selected data. Subsequently we 
will describe our methodology. This embodies an estimation of the leverage parameter 
using a GJR-GARCH model, followed by panel data methodology to obtain the 
parameters of the firm-specific variables. 
3.1 Data 
For the data we have several criteria, since the aim is to measure the influence of a 
certain firm specific variable on the conditional variance, we need a sample with 
enough variety, both in the time dimension and in the cross-sectional dimension.  
 
3.1.1 Gathering and Screening of Data 
To conduct this research, data is used from a variety of economies in Europe. The 
three biggest economies are chosen and are assumed to accurately represent the 
whole European economy. These economies are Germany, The United Kingdom and 
France (Eurostat, 2014). We start off with every listed company of these countries 
as given by DataStream and come to a dataset of 1117 listed companies.  
 
The data is retrieved on a daily basis, as volatility is best measured using high 
frequency data. Furthermore the data is obtained over a period of sixteen years, 
starting in 1999 and ending in 2014. The reason for this is that we have several 
volatility clusters in this time interval. First, the build up to the bubble of 2000 and 
the drop after, second the cluster of drop between 2007 and 2009 due to the 
financial crisis and then drop in 2011 as a result of the European debt crisis. These 
are interesting phenomena in terms of volatility clustering and should provide us 
with valuable insights into the markets’ behavior.  
 
The data is consequently screened on several factors. The first is that we want our 
panel data to be as balanced as possible. This means that we want all companies to 
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show their price levels for every observation, from 1999 to 2014. All companies that 
do not adhere to this requirement are removed. After this is done, the returns of the 
remaining companies are calculated. Doing so exposes the quality of the data in a 
very obvious way. DataStream is not consistent when it comes to the accuracy of the 
stock prices. Some are as accurate as three decimals, whereas some have none. As a 
result we observed many zero stock returns, which in some cases is likely due to the 
accuracy of the data. Because these zero stock returns are likely to distort our 
returns in an unfair way, we have removed series that have more than 10% of zero 
stock returns.  
 
All of these measures have a tremendous impact on the quantity of the companies 
that are employed to conduct our research on. From the initial 1117 companies, 290 
are eventually left to be used. This is still a quite large number of stocks, but 
significantly less than the original number. This obviously could question the 
validity of the research, which will be addressed later on in this chapter.  
 
3.1.2 Firm Specific Variables and Panel Data 
In order to test for firm specific variable influences, we make an important 
observation; the variables have the ability to vary heavily over the course of time. 
This implies that a certain value may accurately depict the situation of a company at 
one time, but may be completely off point several years later. For this reason we 
employ panel data, in order to compensate for this. To do so, we divide the sixteen 
years of data into eight branches of two years. We do so for both the returns (from 
3.1.1) and for the firm specific variables.  
 
The consequence is that we need to retrieve the firm specific variables for each firm 
eight times. It is worth noting that the variables are collected in the middle of each 
sample of two years. As an example: for the first branch of two years (1999 – 2000), 
the values for the firm specific variables are collected on December 31st of 1999. The 
reason for this is that we make the assumption that the characteristics of the firm 
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are best resembled by the value the firm specific variables taken at this point in 
time.  
 
The firm specific variables are retrieved for all 290 firms using DataStream and are 
for the most part complete. The variables that are used are those mentioned in 
chapter 2.2; Debt-Equity, Net margin levels, Price-Earnings and Firm size. 
Furthermore we would like to mention that the first two variables are a percentage, 
Price-Earnings is obviously a ratio and Firm size is given in thousands.  Table 1 gives 
brief descriptive statistics of the retrieved values and shows that the data has quite 
a high variance (as depicted by Std. Dev.). This is important, as the odds of retrieving 
meaningful observations are positively correlated to the spread of the explanatory 
variables. Furthermore, Appendix I graphically shows that the observations of our 
firm specific variables are highly spread out across the spectre.  
 
Table 1 (as well as Appendix I) shows that the values are not evenly distributed. 
This is clear from the difference between the mean and the median in all variables. 
This is not a problem, as the standard deviation is at an acceptable level for each 
variable.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Firm Specific Variables      
  Debt Level Price-Earnings Enterprise Value3 Net Margin 
Mean  112.71 23.20   21.188  9.91 
Median 57.30  16.40   3.839   5.66 
Std. Dev. 242.96 23.00   53.183  19.79 
Observations 2286  1980   2264   2194 
 
                                                        
3 In billions of Euros 
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3.1.3 Representativeness of the Data 
An important point of attention is the representativeness of the results as they 
follow from the data that is used. As the data is reduced significantly in quantity one 
might question this representativeness.  
 
Once again looking at Table 1 and Appendix I, it is clear that there is a wide variance 
(as portrayed by Std. Dev.), which is to the further benefit of the measurability of 
variable specific influences on the main variable of interest: the size of volatility 
asymmetries. This also makes a case for the representativeness of the data, as a 
large variance in the data suggests that the companies come from great variety of 
the economy as a whole. Furthermore the number of observations is well beyond 
what is an acceptable number of companies (>200 as a rule of thumb).  
On top of this it is interesting that, when looking at Appendix I, the distribution of 
the dataset in terms of firm specific variables largely remains the same through 
time.  
 
As a preliminary conclusion then we find that the dataset is not perfect, but that the 
available data in combination with the requirements forms a stable basis for this 
research.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
To find the effect of certain firm specific effects on the conditional volatility of a firm 
we employ two models: the first is a GJR-GARCH(1,1)-model and the second is panel 
data.  
 
3.2.1 The GJR-GARCH(1,1) Model 
There are two different types of asymmetric GARCH-models: the E-GARCH and the 
GJR-GARCH. The models are basically the same, but empirical results show that the 
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GJR-GARCH achieves the most accurate forecasts (Liu & Hung, 2010), so we choose 
it to be our asymmetric volatility forecasting model. 
 
The GJR-GARCH(1,1)-model (22) with a basic mean (23) is specified as follows: 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝑖𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 (22) 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑟𝑖,𝑡] (23) 
 
For stock i in this model 
 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2   represents the conditional forecasted variance, 
 𝜔𝑖  the mean variance, 
 𝛼𝑖  variance dependence on previous lag error terms, 
 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
2   previous lag error term, 
 𝛽𝑖 variance dependence on previous lag variance terms, 
 𝛾𝑖 the magnitude of the leverage effect and 
 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 the dummy variable: 
 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 = 1 ∀ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0 ∀ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 ≥ 0 . 
 
Furthermore the following restrictions are applied: 𝜔𝑖 > 0, 𝛼𝑖 > 0, 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝛼𝑖 +
 𝛾𝑖 > 0. 
3.2.1.1 Assumptions 
To be able to put this model into work we make several assumptions. The first is 
that we assume that the returns of a stock are, on average, zero. This implies that, 
referring to equation (23); every return there is on a stock automatically equals the 
error term for that observation. In this sense we go along with (Figlewski, 1997). 
The second assumption we make is about the distribution of the errors. The 
distribution we use is the Normal distribution, because this is paramount for the 
specification of the likelihood function. More on this assumption follows. 
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3.2.1.2 The Estimation of the GJR-GARCH(1,1) Model 
Estimating GARCH-models brings with it a challenge. The usual OLS estimation 
cannot be used, since the errors, which are being modeled, are non-linear. We 
therefore turn to Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). MLE aims to maximize a 
set Log Likelihood (LLH) function by finding the optimal values for the parameters 
used in the GARCH model. The LLH is given by the following equation: 
𝐿 = −
𝑇
2
log(2𝜋) −
1
2
∑ log(𝜎𝑡
2)
𝑇
𝑡=1
−
1
2
∑
(𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑟𝑡])
2
𝜎𝑡
2
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (24) 
Given that we assume that E[rt] = μ = 0 and that the error term therefore equals the 
returns, we get the following: 
𝐿 = −
𝑇
2
log(2𝜋) −
1
2
∑ log(𝜎𝑡
2)
𝑇
𝑡=1
−
1
2
∑
𝑟𝑡
2
𝜎𝑡
2
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (25) 
Where σt2 is provided by the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-model.  
 
Essential in this LLH-function is the assumption of the distribution of the errors. By 
default the errors are assumed to be normally distributed, however it has been 
proven that this is generally not the case. The distribution of returns, and thus the 
distribution of the errors, tends to be more heavily tailed, so a student distribution 
would be more appropriate (Officer, 1972). Using the Student t-distribution could 
however lead to inconsistent parameter estimations. However, supposing that the 
returns of a series are not normally distributed, but in fact do have fatter tails, will 
still result in consistent parameters (Brooks, 2008). 
 
We will therefore employ the probability density function (PDF) that assumes a log-
normal distribution. This PDF will be used for every observation in every series and 
consequently the sum of the individual PDFs will be maximized by MS Excel’s Solver 
function. Solver will do this by changing the parameters used for the GJR-
GARCH(1,1)-model, until an optimum has been reached. The PDF used is shown in 
equation (26).  
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𝐿𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑃 [−
𝑟𝑡
2
𝜎𝑡
2]) (26) 
The maximization of the sum of all PDFs will then eventually lead to the MLE of the 
individual parameters of the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-model. 
 
3.2.2 Panel Data 
The estimation of the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-model has eventually yielded four 
parameters; ω, α, β and γ. It is the last one, γ, which we are interested in, as it 
portrays the dependence of the forecasted volatility on the leverage effect. To check 
if firm specific variables have an influence on the size of this dependence, we will 
use panel data. We do this, because we assess that firm specific variables vary 
heavily over time. In the cross-section this means regressing the firm specific 
variables as independent variables to find their relation with the size of the leverage 
effect. In terms of a panel data regression then, this can be portrayed as follows: 
𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,𝑡(𝐸𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑡(
𝑃
𝐸⁄ )𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜌𝑖,𝑡(
𝐷
𝐸⁄ )𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 (27) 
 
To estimate this equation we have a choice of two models: either the random effects 
model or the fixed effects model. In order to make a choice for either, we employ the 
Hausman test. With the results of this test we employ one of them and regress the 
various firm specific variables on the size of the leverage effect and will find out 
whether or not these variables have a significant influence.  
 
3.2.2.1 Fixed Effects Model 
To see how the fixed effects model works we have to consider the following 
equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (28) 
This is the standard equation for panel data. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 are, respectively, our 
dependent variable and explanatory variable, both in cross-sectional dimension i,  as 
in time-series dimension, t. 𝛼 Is the intercept and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is the disturbance term, which 
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is of particular interest in the fixed effects model. Since in the fixed effects model the 
disturbance term is decomposed into two separate terms: 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜚𝑖𝑡 (29) 
Where 𝜇𝑖 is the individual specific effect and 𝜚𝑖𝑡 is the remainder disturbance term. 
So we can re-specify to equation (30): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜚𝑖𝑡 (30) 
 
As mentioned before, 𝜇𝑖 is the individual specific effect. When we have N different 
variables in the cross-section, we can use dummy variables for every firm specific 
effect. The formula for the fixed effect model will then look like this: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇1𝐷1𝑖 + 𝜇2𝐷2𝑖 + 𝜇3𝐷3𝑖 … + 𝜇𝑁𝐷𝑁𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (31) 
 
3.2.2.2 Random Effects Model 
As an alternative for the fixed effects model we can use the random effects model. 
The random effects model suggests the use a separate term for the individual 
specific effect, which is constant over time and is the same as with the fixed effects 
model. 
 
The difference, however, is that the random effects model assumes that the 
individual specific intercepts of each cross-sectional unit are dependent on a 
common intercept 𝛼, which is the same for every cross-sectional unit as over time. 
The other term is the error ∈𝑖 that varies in the cross-section and measures the 
deviation of the individual intercept term around the common intercept 𝛼. The 
equations are as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 (32) 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 =∈𝑖+ 𝜚𝑖𝑡 (33) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 And 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 are still the same as in the random effects model. But instead of using 
dummy variables, the firm specific effect is captured by the individual error term ∈𝑖 . 
For this term we have the assumptions of a zero mean, independent of the error 𝜚𝑖𝑡 
and the explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and the assumption of constant variance. 
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Because ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates the parameters inefficiently, the 
generalized least squares method (GLS) is recommended to estimate the 
parameters. 
 
3.2.2.3 Hausman Test 
To decide if we should use the random effects model or the fixed effects model, we 
have to compare the two. The random effects model should in general be more 
efficient than the fixed effects model. It saves degrees of freedom and fewer 
parameters have to be estimated. The random effects model, however, has more 
restrictions that the fixed effects model. Because it assumes that ∈𝑖 and 𝜚𝑖𝑡 are 
uncorrelated with 𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is also required to be independent. 
 
To see whether we can apply the random effects model or the fixed effects model, 
we can test if the error term 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is independent with the x-variables. A common test 
for this is the Hausman test, named after the founder of the methodology (Hausman, 
1978).  Under the null hypothesis the Hausman test assumes that both models are 
consistent, but one (in this case the random effects model) is more efficient. Under 
the alternative hypothesis the assumption is that the more efficient model is 
inconsistent, so the fixed effects model would be preferred.  
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4 Results and Discussion 
In this chapter the results from the various tests will be presented and discussed as 
they follow from the data that is used. This chapter will start off with the results 
from the GJR-GARCH(1,1) and will then put them in further context using the panel-
data with firm-specific variables. 
 
4.1 Results from the GJR-GARCH(1,1) Model 
Figure 1 shows the size of the volatility asymmetry throughout this sample of 
sixteen years. The same, but more elaborate figure is shown in Appendix II. As is 
immediately clear is that the size of the volatility asymmetries is not normally 
distributed. The Jarque-Bera test yields a p-value of 0.000 for normality, which 
follows from a kurtosis of 3.724. The null-hypothesis of normality is clearly 
rejected4.  Furthermore the mean of the leverage effect parameter, 𝛾, is about 0.12 
and the median about 0.10. The standard deviation is 0.078, which means the 
spread is moderately high. 
 
Figure 1: The Size of the Volatility Asymmetries 
 
                                                        
4 Henceforth: Significance levels are at 5%, unless stated otherwise. 
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Furthermore we have looked at the development of the size of the volatility 
asymmetry through time. This is graphically shown in Figure 2. The figure roughly 
shows the same distribution as the total sample in Figure 1. But it also shows that 
the size of the volatility asymmetry is not stable through time, as is also apparent 
from table 2. This observation then gives rise to the idea that volatility asymmetry is 
not just due to, for instance, firm specific variables, but may also be influenced by 
market situations or other global developments. Striking is that the asymmetry is 
relatively larger in the sub-periods of 2001 – 2002 and 2007 – 2008. This could 
mean that investor sentiment, which is generally negative after a bubble or crisis, 
plays a substantial role in stock volatility. The answer to this anomaly may very well 
be in the irrational or sentimental nature of investors.  
 
Figure 2: The Size of the Volatility Asymmetries through Time 
 
 
Table 2: Average Size Volatility Asymmetry throughout the Years 
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2007-2008
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2013-2014
Period 1999-2000 2001-2002 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 2011-2012 2013-2014
γ 0.098 0.145 0.083 0.130 0.161 0.097 0.107 0.110
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4.2 Results from the Panel Data Tests 
4.2.1 Hausman Test 
After the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-model estimation to obtain the size of the leverage effect, 
we have to estimate the effect of firm specific variables by use of the panel data 
technique. The first step for panel data is to perform the Hausman test, to ensure 
that the appropriate model is used for the respective data. As a reminder, under the 
null-hypothesis the Hausman test states that the random effects model is the 
appropriate model for the panel data set. Rejecting this null-hypothesis means that 
the fixed effects model is to be used. The comprehensive results for this test are 
shown in Appendix III. With a test statistic of 0.0026, the null-hypothesis is clearly 
rejected and the fixed effects model will be adopted in the cross-section to test for 
firm specific influences on the size of the volatility asymmetry. 
 
4.2.2 Panel data results 
Using the fixed effects model, Appendix IV shows the comprehensive results for the 
estimated relationship between the firm specific variables and the size of the 
volatility asymmetry. A short summary of this estimation is provided in Table 3 
below. What immediately becomes clear is that there are numerous effects that 
seem to influence the size of the volatility asymmetry. 
 
Table 3: Output Panel Data         
𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,𝑡(𝐸𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑡(
𝑃
𝐸⁄ )𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜌𝑖,𝑡(
𝐷
𝐸⁄ )𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Parameter  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic 
𝑐𝑖,𝑡   0.0991  0.0047  21.1780*** 
𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡   3.63E-10  8.42E-11  4.3152*** 
𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡   0.0006  0.0002  3.0406*** 
𝑃/𝐸𝑖,𝑡   0.0003  0.0001  2.8670*** 
𝐷/𝐸𝑖,𝑡   -2.61E-05  1.61E-05  -1.6234 
Significant at the * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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It is hard to give an interpretation to the size of these coefficients and how big the 
effects actually are. Therefore, graphs of the effect of the significant firm specific 
variables on the leverage effect are shown in Appendix V. These graphs will show 
how the leverage effect changes, under various values of the variables. 
 
4.2.2.1 Firm Size 
Starting with the proxy for size, the Enterprise Value (EV), has a significant influence 
on the size of volatility asymmetries. This proxy boasts a t-statistic of 4.315, 
resulting in a p-value of 0.0000, which makes it significant. The sign here is positive, 
but seems to be very small (3.63E-10). This, however, is deceiving. The enterprise 
value is measured in thousands of Euros, while most of the companies have an 
enterprise value of billions. Still, a ten billion Euro change in size would result in an 
increase of 0,00363 in the size of the volatility asymmetry, which has an average of 
0,12. This is not that much.  This leads to a first conclusion that the size of a firm has 
a slight positive influence on the size of volatility asymmetries, whereof the effect 
should not be underestimated. The t-statistic confirms this, as the influence of size 
appears to be very significant.  
 
The sign, however, is a surprise, as common theory would expect larger firms to be 
more stable, so have a smaller coefficient of the leverage effect parameter. Instead, 
the size of firms seems to be positively correlated with the size of volatility 
asymmetries. This would suggest that firms that are smaller tend to be less affected 
by a downward turn in their stock price. The market then, apparently perceives less 
risk when this happens to small firms than when it happens to larger firms. This, 
however, would contradict theory about bigger firms being more stable. 
 
A more plausible explanation would be, that there is simply less activity on the 
market when it comes to stocks of smaller firms, as (Ciner, 2003) suggests. Also, a 
downturn of a “big” stock would get more attention, which can result in 
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overreaction of the market; hence, more volatility. Regardless of why, the 
relationship between the volatility asymmetry and firm size is significantly positive. 
 
4.2.2.2 Net Margin 
The second estimated parameter is that of the Net Margin (NM). This also shows a 
significant t-statistic of 3.041, leading to a p-value of 0.0024. This is a little less than 
the EV, but a very strong sign nonetheless. Interesting is that the sign is positive, 
with a coefficient value of 0.000556. This means that an increase in the NM of 1% 
will lead to an increase of the volatility asymmetry of 0.00056. This is a minor 
increase. As stated before, the sign is positive. This would mean that a higher 
efficiency leads to a higher sensibility to negative shocks, in terms of volatility.  
 
This is along the lines of the idea that higher margins tend to temporary in nature 
and cannot be sustained over longer periods of time. In this sense the market 
perceives the company to be in a state that it cannot maintain for a long time and 
will correct this. This theory is weak at best, as NMs are usually quite sturdy and 
tend to remain the same for extended periods of time, at the least for the medium 
term.  Nonetheless, higher margins do seem to cause the market to respond more 
heavily to negative shocks.  
 
4.2.2.3 Price-Earnings Ratio 
The third estimated parameter is that of the Price-Earnings ratio. This ratio also 
shows a significant result, with a t-statistic of 2.867 and an accompanying p-value of 
0.0042. The sign here is positive again, which may confirm the earlier suspected 
theory of overvaluation, which could also be in play for the NM. A higher P/E-ratio 
leads to an increase in the size of the volatility asymmetry and as a consequence the 
volatility of the stock price spikes relatively heavily when the stock price drops.  
 
This is in sync with overreaction –and correction theories, that state that the market 
suspects a stock to be overvalued and consequently results in a correction.  Contrary 
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to the NM, P/E-ratios are not usually that sturdy, but have the ability to fluctuate a 
lot more. This is of course due to the fact that companies are dependent on more 
factors to create value, than just the NM. The behavioral explanation is therefore 
quite likely to hold here.  
 
4.2.2.4 Leverage  
The last, but not least interesting parameter to be estimated is that of the level of 
debt relative to equity. Interesting is that this parameter is the only of the tested 
four that yields an insignificant result, with a t-statistic of -1.623 and accompanying 
p-value of 0.1048. This means that this variable is not significant, not even at a 10% 
level. For completeness the sign of this parameter is also mentioned and 
surprisingly this value is negative (-2.61E-05).  
 
To entertain this thought more, this would mean that a higher level of debt would 
lead to reduced sensitivity to negative shocks, in terms of volatility. This is a 
remarkable observation, as it contradicts the original thought of the leverage effect. 
However, it is also in sync with what other research has found since (Black, 1976), 
that the leverage effect is not due to financial leverage. Even though theory on this 
factor is quite strong this factor does not seem to significantly increase or decrease 
the size of the “leverage effect”.  
 
4.2.2.5 The Model as a Whole 
Looking then at the model as a whole, more specifically the R-squared value of 
0.216, we find that this model appears to have a fair fit. Taking into account that this 
model only uses four firm specific variables as explanatory variables, it quickly 
follows that firm specific variables have an extensive impact on volatility 
asymmetries. Using more of those could be a valuable addition.  
 
Compelling in this test is the fact that three out of the four used explanatory 
variables show a significant effect on the size of the volatility asymmetry. What 
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makes it even more compelling is that the one variable that is not significant is the 
leverage effect. So our findings do not contradict findings in previous research. 
Furthermore the nature of the outcomes is interesting. The variables all have a more 
theoretical and behavioral side to them. In every case the behavioral case seems to 
have the upper hand. This thesis does not go into the specific detailed theory behind 
every variable, but presents the obvious underlying theories as possible 
explanations. These behavioral arguments however, seem to provide the 
explanation in every variable that was tested. Market rationality, as one would also 
expect with the original leverage explanation, does not appear to explain anything in 
this sense. This is also not totally unexpected, as an explanation for any asymmetry 
is usually easily found in the behavioral corner of finance. 
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5 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter will summarize the thesis and briefly discuss the results that are 
obtained. Furthermore the findings are placed in a broader perspective, both with 
regard to previous research, but also with regard to possible future research. 
 
5.1 Summary 
Looking at the results from the tests one can conclude that several firm specific 
variables significantly influence the size of volatility asymmetries. Out of the four 
firm specific variables that were test, three have a significant impact. Striking is that 
leverage is the one exception that does not have this significant relationship. 
Furthermore the model has an R-squared value of 0.216, which is relatively high. 
The conclusion then is that firm specific variables and maybe other factors, such as 
market- or global factors, have a definite relation to the size of volatility 
asymmetries.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
With these observations it is clear that the main research question can be answered 
in a certain fashion. The question asked in the introduction was the following: 
 
“Which firm specific attributes, if any, enhance the “leverage” effect?” 
 
The leverage effect seems to be determined at least in part by firm specific variables, 
but not as (Black, 1976) states, by leverage itself. As far as this thesis can judge, by 
the use of firm-specific variables that were deemed fit, there are several firm 
specific factors that at least enhance the “leverage effect”. These variables are the 
firm size, operating efficiency and overpricing. The proxies for these variables all 
yield significant positive results.   
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5.3 In Context of Previous Research 
As stated several times before, the findings directly contradict those of (Black, 
1976), but only in the sense that the results find that financial leverage does not 
affect the volatility asymmetries. Furthermore continued support for market 
irrationality is found. Looking at the parameter from the P/E-ratio, the same 
conclusion as (Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994) is found, that the market seems 
to correct overvalued stocks. On the other hand the results contradict the work of 
(Chan & Chen, 1991), that larger firms are more stable.  
 
However, in the end we must plainly face the fact that research into this area of 
volatility forecasting has not been done yet. 
 
5.4 Recommendations for Further Research and Final Remarks 
This particular niche of volatility forecasting has hardly been delved into before and 
as such this thesis is the first to do so. This thesis is merely a start, so based on our 
findings we have several recommendations. The first being the obvious, that more 
research should be conducted into the effect of firm specific variables. As no 
research has been performed with firm specific variables and we only use four of 
them, a lot is yet to be gained by more extensive research. A higher quality of the 
data would help immensely in this sense. Furthermore we recommend research on 
other factors that might cause volatility asymmetries and then in particular market 
conditions. This is based on our finding that the size of the leverage effect was 
higher during times of crisis, so market conditions may very well have their own 
specific influencing aspect. The last recommendation is that research has to be done 
to the underlying causes of the factors that seem to contribute to the size of 
volatility asymmetries. Anticipating these underlying factors may prove to be as 
least as helpful as having knowledge of the existence of their impact.  
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Appendix I: Firm Specific Variables through Time 
This appendix shows, in four parts, the spread of the various firm specific variables. 
It does this for both the cross section and the time dimension. Note that for every 
figure the right most observation spikes due to the cumulative frequency of the 
more extreme observations.  
7.1.1 Firm Size 
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7.1.2 Net Margin 
 
7.1.3 Price-Earnings ratio 
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7.1.4 Debt-Equity  
 
 
7.2 Appendix II: Size of the Volatility Asymmetry 
Below the more comprehensive statistics of the volatility asymmetries can be found. 
This output is directly taken from Eviews. 
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7.3 Appendix III: Hausman Test 
The table below shows the (visually altered) Eviews output on the Hausman test for 
the panel dataset. The actual test is shown on the top of the table. Note that we use a 
5% significance level to determine whether or not to reject the Random Effects 
Model. 
 
 
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 16,318425 4 0,0026
Cross-section random effects test comparisons:
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
EV 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0009
NM 0,0006 0,0004 0,0000 0,2726
PE 0,0003 0,0002 0,0000 0,1409
DE 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0858
Cross-section random effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: Y
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2013
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 272
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1535
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.099130 0.004681 21.17801 0.0000
EV 3.63E-10 8.42E-11 4.315152 0.0000
NM 0.000556 0.000183 3.040599 0.0024
PE 0.000326 0.000114 2.866956 0.0042
DE -2.61E-05 1.61E-05 -1.623383 0.1048
R-squared 0.215838     Mean dependent var 0.118560
Adjusted R-squared 0.044555     S.D. dependent var 0.079362
S.E. of regression 0.077574     Akaike info criterion -2.113767
Sum squared resid 7.576353     Schwarz criterion -1.154279
Log likelihood 1898.317     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.756736
F-statistic 1.260126     Durbin-Watson stat 2.358190
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005611
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
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7.4 Appendix IV: Panel Data Output 
The table below depicts the output from the estimation of the panel data set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Y
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2013
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 272
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1535
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.099130 0.004681 21.17801 0.0000
EV 3.63E-10 8.42E-11 4.315152 0.0000
NM 0.000556 0.000183 3.040599 0.0024
PE 0.000326 0.000114 2.866956 0.0042
DE -2.61E-05 1.61E-05 -1.623383 0.1048
R-squared 0.215838     Mean dependent var 0.118560
Adjusted R-squared 0.044555     S.D. dependent var 0.079362
S.E. of regression 0.077574     Akaike info criterion -2.113767
Sum squared resid 7.576353     Schwarz criterion -1.154279
Log likelihood 1898.317     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.756736
F-statistic 1.260126     Durbin-Watson stat 2.358190
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005611
Panel Data Estimations
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7.5 Appendix V: Graphic Interpretation Panel Data Results 
This appendix shows graphically, in three parts, the effect of the significant firm 
specific variables on the leverage effect. It does so to give a better understanding of 
the size of the coefficients, which we obtained from our panel data test. Note that 
this is just a simple graphic explanation of our results. It shows how the size of the 
volatility asymmetry, found on the y-axis, changes when the x-variable differs from 
the mean, which is shown on the middle of the x-axis.  
 
7.5.1 Firm Size 
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7.5.2 Net Margin 
 
 
7.5.3 Price-Earnings ratio 
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